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Karlo Basta and Ailsa Henderson
University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT
This article explores how the asymmetric institutionalization of the United Kingdom’s multina-
tionality interacted with the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK’s political elite has traditionally
accepted the country’s multinational character, but democratic institutionalization of it
occurred relatively recently and in a remarkably asymmetric manner. Only the UK’s minority
nations possess devolved governments, while the largest nation, England, is governed directly
from the center. This framework has consequences for the pandemic response. It has clarified
the relevance of devolved legislatures, but also highlights continued resistance of the UK’s
governing elite to acknowledge the multi-level character of the state.
The United Kingdom is an unusual multinational state. Its legitimizing ideology—
British unionism—acknowledges multinationality in ways that stand out from other
such settings where state nationalism tends to crowd out national pluralism. At the
same time, the UK’s institutions constitute a singularly asymmetric expression of that
multinationality. While the populations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are
governed both by the UK and devolved governments, the country’s largest nation,
England, is governed directly from the center, without a set of intermediate democratic
institutions, offering incomplete coverage across England. Westminster, therefore, wears
multiple hats, generating, at times, policy for the whole of the UK, for England and
Wales, or for England alone.
The main reason behind this configuration is the way in which the UK’s political
elites, drawn predominantly from England, conceive of the state they are governing.
Rather than seeing the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the 1999 devolution settlements as
the central feature of the UK’s constitutional DNA, the country’s leaders regard them as
issues to be managed on an ad hoc basis whenever a crisis emerges into open view in
one of the devolved jurisdictions. By extension, the multi-level character of the state is
not reflected in the decision-making processes at the center. Instead, the UK is run
largely as a unitary state, with the governing elites frequently conflating the priorities of
the largest constituent nation—England—with those of the entire country. This elite
perspective is rooted in broad-based indifference among the English population to the
United Kingdom’s multinational character.1
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In this article, we show how the UK’s peculiarly (under)institutionalized multinational,
multi-level settlement interacted with the COVID-19 pandemic. In line with the focus of
this special issue, we explore both how the UK’s multinationality influenced the country’s
approach to the pandemic, and how the pandemic has reflected on the UK multinational
settlement. On the one hand, we show that the rather weak institutionalization of the multi-
level system has militated against close intergovernmental collaboration in response to the
crisis. This system has also given the devolved governments the opportunity to visibly differ-
entiate themselves from their UK counterpart. The pandemic seems to have reinforced cen-
trifugal tendencies that were already intensifying in response to Brexit in Scotland and
Wales, if from different starting points. On the other hand, the pandemic and the multiple
crises (for example, health and economic/fiscal) it has generated have thrown into sharper
relief the lack of awareness of, or attention to, the state’s multi-level character among
England-based political and media elites, a phenomenon we cover in the last substan-
tive section.
We offer two caveats. First, since we foreground the role of the Anglo-British elites
in shaping the politics of the UK’s multinationality, and in light of space constraints, we
do not explore in detail the impact of the pandemic on the internal politics of devolved
jurisdictions. Such an examination would require an article of its own. We nevertheless
touch upon some of the ways the pandemic has interacted with the politics of national
identity in sub-state nations. We focus on Scotland in particular given majority support
for independence in recent polls, support that predates the pandemic but that has inter-
acted with it in interesting ways.2 Second, in light of the thematic focus of this special
issue, we endeavor to cover a lot of ground in relatively short space—including both the
impact of the UK’s multinational settlement on pandemic response and the influence of
the pandemic on the UK’s multinational context. We are aware that this necessitates a
more limited treatment of both sets of issues, but we believe it is important to context-
ualize the interaction between multinationality and COVID-19 from both angles in
order to provide readers with a more comprehensive image of the interaction between
UK’s multinationality and the pandemic.
In the next section, we point to typical characteristics of multinational states, including
the kinds of ideational and institutional configurations that tend to arise in response to
claims by minority nations. Our focus is on majority and minority national identities and
narratives that tend to emerge, and the ways in which these narratives shape the political
contestation at the heart of multinational states. In the second section, we contrast the
UK multinational experience to this pattern and suggest how the ideational and institu-
tional dimensions of UK’s multinationalism shaped the country’s COVID-19 response. In
the third section, we demonstrate, using UK government press events, how the pandemic
has highlighted the UK government’s inconsistent—and at times neglectful—approach to
the UK’s multinationality. In the concluding section, we reiterate our conclusions about
what the pandemic shows about the character of the UK as a multinational state.
The multinational condition
The defining characteristic of a multinational state is the conditional legitimacy of its
political-territorial order.3 In nation-states, the territory, the monistic character of the
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political community, and the key myths of that community, are taken for granted to
such a degree that their social constructedness recedes from view. Public challenges to
the territorial integrity of the state are more likely to elicit ridicule than apprehension.4
By contrast, in multinational states, territorial integrity is not necessarily in constant
jeopardy, but it is not taken for granted to the same degree. The legitimacy of the
specific territorial-political order is conditional, particularly in those communities whose
members consider their collective interests or their identity as being potentially sidelined
within the common state framework. These may, but need not be, demographic minor-
ities. If members of those communities can be persuaded that their interests are not
being served, or their visions of the state not expressed in symbolically appropriate
ways, they may call for the institutional reconfiguration of the state (for example,
through greater autonomy or formal recognition). Should this not be forthcoming, they
may withdraw their consent to being governed within the common state framework
altogether, and pursue independence.
Scholarship on the multinational state has converged largely on the latter scenario—
the potential for political crises that result either in peaceful secession of a territory, or
in a violent clash motivated by self-determination contests. Since self-determination
struggles become internationally prominent only when claimant communities make
their demands for independence known—either through mass mobilization or by taking
up arms—most of the scholarship on self-determination struggles tends to focus on the
minority side of the equation.5 Literature on the role of territorial autonomy and
power-sharing almost universally emphasizes the influence of those institutional options
on the political actions of minority/claimant communities.6 A similar trend prevails in
the more recent work on secession.7
Yet it is difficult to understand the multinational state without paying attention not
only to the politics of minority nationalism, but also to the nationalism of majorities.8
Minority claims, including secessionist ones, do not emerge in a vacuum. They are an
iterative product of interaction between different political projects, both “within” com-
munities and across them.9 Indeed, the past decade or so has seen greater scholarly
attention paid to majority nationalism in its various incarnations.10 Especially important
is the knowledge of how various communities and their representatives understand the
institutions of the state.
Competing institutional visions are at the heart of the multinational predicament.11
As noted at the start of this section, the multinational condition is partly a matter of
institutional perceptions and institutional legitimacy. While members of minority
nations diverge among themselves in terms of institutional preferences, they are, in the
aggregate, far more likely to question the common state as a good in itself than are
majorities. Their commitment to the state is, to put it differently, conditioned by the
extent to which they believe that the state protects their interests and articulates and
expresses their identity.12 Majorities, on the other hand, are far more likely to identify
with the entire state and to internalize it as “their own” more or less unconditionally.13
What we see as a result is a fairly predictable set of patterns. Minority nations tend
to demand the right to self-government, either within the common state by way of ter-
ritorial, and less often non-territorial, autonomy, or via external self-determination
(secession). Central elites, normally drawn from the majority community, react in fairly
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predictable ways as well.14 They nearly always resist secession, but are more likely to
contemplate territorial autonomy. Indeed, almost all of the world’s multinational states
are characterized by some level of territorial decentralization or non-centralization.
However, this autonomy is seldom accompanied by formal recognition of the state’s
multinationality, either in the constitutional sense or as a matter of public discourse. Of
course, there is recognition of various lines of diversity, including regional and linguis-
tic, among others, but this need not extend to institutionalization of the multinational
principle. We see this even in some of the longest lasting multinational states such
as Canada.15
The UK multinational state is even more exceptional when set against these trends.
In effect, it has reversed the predictable pattern of accommodation: instead of starting
with territorial autonomy and resisting recognition, it has been more willing to recog-
nize, formally and rhetorically, its multinationalism, but has acknowledged this multina-
tionality via territorial self-government only quite late. At the same time, since the
establishment of devolved legislatures in 1998 and 1999, neither the UK political elite—
notably members representing English constituencies—nor those who elect them, have
been eager to acknowledge the separate political space in the UK’s constituent nations,
the near inevitability of intra-state policy variation flowing from jurisdictional compe-
tence over devolved policy areas, nor has there developed a strong institutional frame-
work to coordinate across different governments. As we show in the rest of this article,
the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed these features of the UK polity more clearly
than before.
The impact of UK multinationalism on the pandemic response
The UK multinational state: a background
By contrast to most other state nationalisms, the UK variety has been quite comfortable
in acknowledging the country’s multinationality. British unionism has tended to be con-
stitutively multinational. It has traditionally recognized national diversity and incorpo-
rated it into state symbols.16 While one can point to the emergence of a British national
identity,17 this identity did not emerge to the exclusion of, say, Scottishness or
Welshness,18 though one might venture that in the English case, the fusion between the
British and English identitarian dimensions was quite pronounced.19 As we note in the
foregoing section, this is typical of majority nationalism, but it is perhaps accentuated
in the UK case by the particularly lopsided demographics of the country, as approxi-
mately 85% of its population resides in England. As importantly, unionism was neither
the only nor necessarily the primary ideational marker for the population of Great
Britain/UK. As Colley argues, both Protestantism and the empire were important cohe-
sive forces that underpinned the UK multinational project.20
At the same time, however, unionists have for most of the past three centuries felt lit-
tle need to supplement the UK’s multinationalism with democratic institutional expres-
sion. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty militated against formal territorial
autonomy and devolution for minority nations, most clearly seen during the 19th and
early 20th century debates on Irish home rule.21 The 19th century introduction of
administrative devolution for Scotland and Wales ensured that civil servants developed
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policy for separate civil institutions—mostly obviously in Scotland given a separate edu-
cation and legal system—but it was more than a hundred years before such policy
reflected the political preferences of those living in the devolved territories rather than
the wishes of the ministers elected by the UK electorate.22 The delay was not merely
due to the hostility on the part of the majority nation but also to hesitance on the part
of the minority electorate.23
Devolution did not produce an immediate political backlash among the majority
community, defined either as electors in England or British-identifiers in Scotland,
Wales or Northern Ireland. This stands in contrast to the Canadian and Spanish reac-
tions to symbolic reconstitution of those two states during the 1980s and 2000s, respect-
ively.24 At an elite level, none of the major state-wide parties made resentment against
devolution a core aspect of their political strategy.25 Indeed, all came to accept devolu-
tion as a positive development in their manifestos, though for different reasons and in
different ways.26
The absence of sustained partisan opposition to devolution does not mean that the
population of England has been indifferent to it. Over the past decade, scholars have
started to outline the gathering resentment, or “devo-anxiety,” among the English with
respect to what they perceive as unfair advantages secured by the Scots in particular.27
Both British and English identifiers believe that Scotland’s share of public spending
should be reduced and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on laws that
affect England alone. At the same time, however, English opposition to devolution as a
matter of principle is weak. While calls for an English Parliament are growing, particu-
larly among those who prioritize an English national identity, the most popular institu-
tional reform has been procedural rather than democratic, in the form of “English votes
for English laws.”28 This provides an additional example of the hesitancy to offer or
pursue democratic devolution for the national communities within the UK, with a pref-
erence for administrative solutions in the first instance.
To summarize, the UK governing elite has historically accepted the multinational
character of the state as a cultural fact, while resisting institutional expression of that
multinationality. Since the late 1990s, the process of devolution has led to increasing
formal acceptance of institutionalized, multi-level multinationalism, but this institution-
alization has been asymmetric, with important political and policy implications. While
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have developed their own institutions of govern-
ance, the demographically dominant population of England continues to be governed
directly, without a coherent or comprehensive intermediate institutional layer. One
could see this institutional asymmetry as an expression of the long-standing tendency to
conflate England and the UK29 that tends to view devolved policy choices as deviations
from the norm.
The impact of the UK’s institutional settlement on pandemic management and
devolved politics
The manner in which devolution has been institutionalized has had important consequences
for the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The devolved governments have control
over health, housing, education, and social care, but do not possess comprehensive fiscal or
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economic policy autonomy. Successive Scotland Acts (2012 and 2016) have broadened
Scottish fiscal autonomy, but the scope for large-scale borrowing remains limited in size and
purpose for both Scotland and Wales.30 This means that while the devolved governments
were in a position to pursue independent policy choices on many public health dimensions
of the pandemic response in their territories, the UK government took the lead on the same
in England and developed and implemented the fiscal response across the UK.
At the same time, the relationship between the devolved governments and the central
administration has been poorly institutionalized, suggesting the relative lack of import-
ance that the central government attaches to the multi-level character of the UK polity.
By contrast to shared-rule federations like Germany or Switzerland, the devolved gov-
ernments have no parliamentary representation at the center. Unlike other self-rule
devolved or federal states, such as Canada and Spain, the formal intergovernmental
channels of the UK are underdeveloped.31 The Joint Ministerial Committee system, the
UK’s principal intergovernmental forum, is consultative and does not meet on a suffi-
ciently regular basis to facilitate productive coordination in policy-making.32 While the
early response to the pandemic was coordinated, though not through the JMC, the cen-
tral government subsequently charted its own course with far less collaboration with the
devolved governments.33
The pandemic, combined with devolution in health care, but without strong institu-
tionalization in the intergovernmental domain, shaped the devolved government
response. While devolved governments implemented largely the same public health poli-
cies as the central government, and with similar health outcomes, they distinguished
themselves from Westminster largely through differentiated timing in the implementa-
tion of those policies. Below, we focus on Scotland.
Throughout 2020 the SNP government in Scotland tended to implement more cau-
tious measures sooner than the central government and typically loosened those meas-
ures later than the UK government. Table 1 summarizes some of these differences. The
Scottish First Minister also provided daily press briefings, typically taking these herself
rather than rotating the role with scientific advisors or other ministers. The Scottish
electorate responded positively to both policy variation—which was more in line with
cautious electorate preferences—and to the First Minister herself. By autumn 2020, 44%
of Scots rated the Scottish government either 8, 9 or 10/10 (very well). Only nine per-
cent gave the same rating to the UK government (with one in five rating them 0—very
poorly—out of 10). As for the leaders, almost half (49%) rated Sturgeon’s performance
as 8, 9 or 10/10 while only 7% gave the same rating to Johnson. In part this is because
nearly half of Scots rated Johnson’s performance as 0, 1 or 2 out of 10. In short, half of
Scots thought Sturgeon was performing in the top three categories of the scale, and
half of Scots thought Johnson was in the bottom three categories of the scale.34 It is
important to note that in a more integrated intergovernmental system, the policy output
might well have been more coordinated and the opportunity for variation restricted as
a result.
At the same time, the pandemic has attracted attention to the legislative competence
and policy choices of devolved actors like never before. Not only were different govern-
ments reacting simultaneously to the same external event, but their policy decisions had
near immediate impact on citizen mobility. Thus, the lack of institutionalization of the
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multi-level system of governance combined with the pandemic to offer a unique oppor-
tunity to all devolved governments to boost their profile among their respective elector-
ates. In the Scottish case in particular, this appeared to accelerate public support for
independence, increasing since the 2019 election but routinely topping 50% since March
of 2020.35 Likewise, the pandemic appears to have influenced a wider range of policy
decisions. The SNP campaigned in the 2021 election on a commitment to holding a
second independence referendum “once the COVID crisis had passed.”36 Since both the
health and economic effects of the pandemic are likely to linger for some time to come,
this commitment gives the returning SNP government ample flexibility over the referen-
dum issue.
The situation in Wales parallels the Scottish developments in some important ways. As
in Scotland, the pandemic offered an opportunity to evaluate simultaneous policy vari-
ation given devolved competence over health. As Table 1 shows, just as in Scotland, the
Welsh government took a more cautious approach to the pandemic management. While
opinion polls showed greater support in Wales than Scotland for the UK government’s
handling of the pandemic, polling on leaders showed far stronger support for the perform-
ance of Welsh First Minister Mark Drakeford, and falling support for Prime Minister
Boris Johnson.37 Drakeford, and the party he leads, Welsh Labour, have pursued a
markedly different approach to the UK government than Sturgeon and the SNP.38
Table 1. A comparison of select UK, Scottish and Welsh governments’ COVID-19 measures
(March–December 2020).
Measure UK government Scottish government Welsh government
Initial lockdown 23 March 23 March 23 March
Lockdown easing
strategy published
11 May (late) 23 April (early) 24 April (early)
Lockdown easing
(retail reopening)




4 July (early) 15 July (late) 13 July (late)
Lockdown easing
(gyms reopened)
25 July (early) 31 August (late) 3 August (late)
Mandatory mask
wearing introduced



























bars but not restos










Full lockdown reintroduced 5 November (early, but
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While support for independence in Wales has increased, now regularly reaching between a
quarter and a third of those sampled, this has not translated into increased support for
Plaid Cymru.39 Welsh Labour has emerged from the pandemic as the party best seen to
stand up for Wales. Thus, in Wales, the combination of pandemic and the specific political
configuration may have strengthened the image of the devolved government, but it has
also resulted in a pro-union government calling for substantial constitutional reform of
the union.
The impact of the pandemic on the UK’s multinationalism
Above we demonstrated how devolved governments’ pandemic management intersected
with the politics of national identity in Scotland and Wales. In this section, we show
that the pandemic has exposed more clearly than before the degree to which the Anglo-
British political and media elites elide England and the UK. Put differently, the pan-
demic has thrown into sharper relief the relatively low salience of the multi-level char-
acter of the UK multinational polity. We start with the discussion of popular
understanding of the multi-level system and the barriers to better understanding of it.
We then turn to the way in which the UK elites have framed the central government’s
response to the pandemic by examining Downing Street press conferences in March
and April of 2020.
The asymmetric nature of devolution has always proved a challenge to UK voters for
three reasons. First, different devolved legislatures had different levels of policy control
so any heuristic shortcuts individuals might employ in federal states would be of limited
use in an asymmetric situation. Put another way, knowing what was happening in one’s
own territory would prove a relatively poor guide to what was happening in other parts
of the state. To some degree, this reflects the different origins of the legislatures, with
devolution to Northern Ireland arriving thanks to an international treaty, and the differ-
ent devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales the result of referendums following a
Labour victory in 1997 and reflecting different levels of enthusiasm within the popula-
tions for constitutional change. Second, the legislative competence of the devolved insti-
tutions has changed since 1999, most dramatically in Wales where the legislature
acquired primary legislative powers following the Government of Wales Act in 2006,
but also in Scotland after successive Scotland Acts expanded the legislature’s capacity
particularly around tax.40 Even if a voter had explored in depth the legislative compe-
tences of the Scottish Parliament in the year leading up to the 2014 referendum, they
would have found significant changes as the full powers of the Scotland Acts 2012 and
2016 came into force in the years after the referendum. Those not living in Scotland or
Wales could be forgiven for not following these debates attentively.
Third, particularly for those in England, media reporting about the legislative compe-
tence of devolved regions, and UK government communications about the territorial
reach of its legislation, has not aided public understanding. Government announcements
frequently occlude, whether by omission or design, the England-only aspects of policy
changes, announcing new plans for hospitals or schools without clarifying that this
applies to England alone. Such is the level of frustration that it has prompted two high
profile Twitter campaigns, the Welsh-based @thatsdevolved, which attempts to correct
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misleading government communications and news reports, and #sayEngland, which
seeks to highlight when the territorial reach of England-only policy is unclear or hidden.
The post-devolution elision of England/Britain/UK by parties and government is a long-
standing and well documented phenomenon in UK politics.41
Related to this is the demographic dominance of England. Often cited as a potential
obstacle to governance arrangements, it is relevant here for the center of gravity for
news reporting. England-based newspapers and network news (from BBC, ITV or Sky)
have considerable reach within Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but the domin-
ance of the English audience means coverage is often unreflectively Anglo-British, with-
out much interrogation into whether the news item applies to the whole of the UK,
Britain, or England. This list obviously includes a combination of effects. Some would
be present in any asymmetric system (the absence of heuristic cues, for example). Still,
the bulk of these are a result of the British manifestation of asymmetric devolution,
namely serial ad hocery42 and unclear communications, in part exacerbated by
England’s demographic dominance.
If one does not live in Scotland and does not know what the Scottish Parliament con-
trols, and then reads English newspapers that report little on any of the devolved legis-
latures or the territorial limits of Westminster’s domestic policy, then opportunities for
learning are limited. Little wonder that the electorates across Britain make different
judgements (and errors) about legislative competence. Scots tend to under-estimate
Holyrood’s powers, and English voters tend to over-estimate it. The result is that 20
years after devolution, the knowledge of legislative competence and the extent of policy
variation is patchy, particularly in England, and there is continued support for policy
uniformity across the whole of the state. The first of these is a direct result of the asym-
metrical nature of the settlement given the absence of reliable cues. On the issue of
knowledge of policy variation, however, the notion that citizens in symmetrical federal
states have a detailed understanding of policy variation across the constituent states is
perhaps optimistic.
What we find in the United Kingdom, however, is that the presence of high-profile
policy deviation in the devolved legislatures is accompanied by high support for those
policies in the devolved regions. This includes free university tuition in Scotland, free
prescriptions in all three devolved territories, a free bus pass for over 55s in Scotland, as
well as free personal care for the elderly.43 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that sup-
port for policy uniformity is high, but that it has both principled and practical consider-
ations—support for policy uniformity in principle out of a sense of social solidarity, and
practical support because people want the same entitlements as the most generous
options on offer.
This support is highest in England, with 70–80% of English respondents favoring uni-
form policy provision across the United Kingdom depending on whether this includes
tuition fees, prescription charges, care for the elderly, and the sentencing for young
offenders. It is not, however, a purely English phenomenon, with substantial propor-
tions of those in territories with devolved legislatures also preferring policy uniformity
across the state. As a result, the UK is home to a devolution paradox: large proportions
of the citizenry view devolved legislatures as legitimate, and indeed in many cases wish
for more power to be devolved, but substantial proportions of those same people want
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policy to be the same.44 Put another way, people in the UK want devolved legislatures
to have the freedom to make identical decisions.45 This background is important to
help explain the various patterns we see in the UK government response to the COVID
pandemic. In what follows we explore attention to the multi-level nature of the UK in
communication of COVID developments, including communications from Westminster
and resulting media coverage.
The COVID-19 crisis demonstrates the limits to the governing elite’s perception of
the UK as a multinational and multi-level state. This is in evidence when we examine
the manner in which the UK government communicated with the UK general public
about the pandemic. In response to the developing public health crisis, the Prime
Minister, often accompanied by his scientific advisors or other government ministers,
began delivering regular press conferences on 3 March 2020. These consisted of pre-
pared statements, followed by questions from journalists, and were broadcast live. The
following discussion draws on an analysis of each of these events throughout the first
two months of the pandemic in March and April 2020. We use this time period deliber-
ately, as the early weeks of grappling with a global pandemic show the UK govern-
ment’s reaction at its most instinctual, before outside actors shaped its response. They
offer, therefore, a truer, unguarded representation of the UK government’s approach to
the multi-national, multi-level character of the UK. Daily press conferences about a sin-
gle event are unprecedented in peace time, which inhibits comparison over time, but
they offer an ideal opportunity to evaluate how, in the midst of a global pandemic, the
UK government reflected or sought to accommodate the multinational character of
the UK.
The UK Government’s COVID press conferences provided important early guidance
about, for example, hand washing, additional advice for those over 70s, and later main-
taining a safe distance, as well as updates on infection rates. An analysis of each of the
prepared statement portions of the first two months of press conferences (3 March to
30 April inclusive) provides an opportunity to assess (a) references to the four territo-
ries explicitly (or the three First Ministers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)
and (b) clarity on the territorial reach of data, new policy, announcements or advice.
The results reveal that members of the electorate attempting to track which rules and
advice applied where and when would have found that task a difficult one.
In March, the Prime Minister made reference to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland
only twice, by referring to the other first ministers, and both times that he was planning
to, or had recently met with them. By April there were three explicit mentions of the
devolved territories. On 8 April, Rishi Sunak announced £60 million of funding through
the Barnett formula to help Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.46 On 21 April,
Health and Social Care Secretary Matt Hancock thanked a range of public bodies and
government departments, with a reference to “the devolved administrations and territor-
ial offices” appearing midway through the list. Later in the month the Transport
Secretary mentioned Northern Ireland in relation to support for ferry and air links to
Belfast and Derry. There were no further mentions of Scotland or Wales and no men-
tions of the first ministers of the three devolved administrations during this period.
When we examine the territorial reach of items covered in the briefings we can look
for two things: first, whether it is possible to infer what the territorial reach is (by
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reference to a legislative competence that is reserved, for example) and second, whether
the territorial reach is explicitly identified. For example, in the first press conference
Boris Johnson announced the existence of coronavirus action plan (if not its content)
and stated that it applied to the whole of the UK. The 12 March statement about not
closing schools, by contrast, would have been a decision for England only (since educa-
tion is devolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) but this was not clarified.
In general, UK government spokespersons almost never clarified when an announce-
ment or a measure applied only to England. Thus, the previously mentioned announce-
ment about schools on 12 March, or the decision 6 days later to close them, did not
state the measures applied only to England. The call for retired healthcare professionals
to return to their posts (and the announcement 5 days later that 7,500 former clinicians
were returning to service) likewise applied only to the NHS in England (as health is
devolved), but this was not specified either. Indeed, throughout March, only one of the
items that applied only to England was explicitly identified as such: Alok Sharma’s
announcement on 28th March that English councils (local governments) were providing
direct funding to businesses affected by lockdown. This was not a sign that the UK gov-
ernment had begun clarifying the territorial reach of various measures. One day later,
Robert Jenrick’s announcement of strategic coordination centers (which applied
throughout England) was described as providing support throughout “this country,”
without specifying what the “country” in question was. On 31 March Michael Gove
employed the same vague term when announcing over 8,000 ventilators were being
deployed. By contrast, the UK government clarified more frequently when items applied
to the whole of the UK, doing so 33 times in March. The most frequent instances of
this were for data on testing, hospitalization and deaths, or for the number of repatri-
ated citizens.
In April, England-only items were flagged more often but only marginally so. This
included Alok Sharma’s 1st April announcement that English councils had received
more than £12 billion for financial assistance to small businesses, and Matt Hancock’s
announcement the next day that 5.7% of doctors in England were off work due to
COVID. The following day, he noted there were over 2,000 critical care beds available
in “this country,” which we can assume applies to England. By 5th April he indeed
clarified that the critical care bed figures were for NHS England, but a week later was
referring to 121,000 gowns that had been delivered around “the country.” This lack of
clarity plagued announcements about the R value as well (16 April).
Across the entire month, England-only items were clarified as such nine times. At
times this was partly because the organization involved had the word “England” in its
name (Public Health England, Highways England). If we look at items that applied to
the whole of the UK, again the territorial reach of this was cited more than for the
England-only items, but less often than the month before. As in March, references to
the UK typically surfaced in figures for testing, positive cases and hospitalization. In
short, during both months there was a consistent lack of clarity on the territorial reach
of a range of announcements, including laptops for students so they could study at
home (presumably referring to England), the number of extra hospital beds (presumably
England), the existence or extension of the coronavirus jobs retention scheme (all UK),
or the number of items of PPE distributed, but that in general government spokespeople
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showed greater efforts at clarifying when things applied to the whole of the UK than
when they applied to England alone.
Two examples help to emphasize just how easily central government representatives
shift between the UK and England-only frame of reference, further contributing to con-
fusion about the constitutional framework of the multi-level state. On 22 April Dominic
Raab thanked the Ministry of Defence and Defence Secretary Ben Wallace for their
efforts. Those watching might or might not have been aware that defence is a reserved
competence, and the MoD has installations across the UK. Raab then went on to pro-
vide examples of MoD assistance, which included delivering the new Nightingale hospi-
tals47 and the new local resilience forums to deliver PPE. The Nightingale hospitals,
however, have been established in England only, while the local resilience forums are
also England only, with similar but differently-named entities in Scotland and Wales.
This was therefore a UK-wide defence ministry delivering England-only contributions.
This is obviously entirely normal, but the announcement lacked clarification that the
various achievements were for England rather than the UK.
Raab also noted that “People used to joke in this country [italics added] that you
could never build a hospital that quickly. Well, we didn’t just build one, we built seven
and we thank our armed forces for helping to make that happen.” There were of course
ten temporary hospitals built in the UK, of which seven were in England. The example
helps to illustrate the sleight of hand by which the territorial frame of references shifts
from the UK to England with very little clarity. The following day, Matt Hancock
announced the need to make progress on test, track and trace, with a goal of 100,000
tests per day. No territorial frame of reference was provided but he later explained the
desire to “make it faster and simpler for any essential worker in England who needs a
test to get a test.” This was accompanied by information on how to book a test, fol-
lowed by “it’s all part of getting Britain back on her feet.” England and Britain are
either so clearly merged in the minds of central government ministers that distinguish-
ing between them makes little sense, or they are willfully constructed as such for public
consumption (Table 2).
Faced with significant obfuscation, both in terms of what the devolved governments
were doing, or when announcements applied only to England, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that media coverage of the multi-level aspects of the UK coronavirus response were
similarly hazy. Research from Cardiff University’s journalism school demonstrates that a
lack of clarity over different policy choices across the UK led to considerable public
confusion.48 This was a direct result of imprecise government messaging, inconsistent
media attention to the relationship between reserved and devolved powers, as well as
Table 2. Attention to territorial reach and devolution in Number 10 press conferences,
March–April 2020.
Explicit references to the four
territories in the UK or three First
Ministers in Scotland, W, NI
Explicit reference to the territorial
reach of policy
March (22 press events, 121 items) 2 England-only 1
GB/UK 33
April (30 press events) 4 England-only 9
GB/UK 27
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four-nation differences in evening news reports. The confusion was sown not by differ-
ence, but by the lack of communication about that difference.
This lack of attention did not go unnoticed. Ofcom, the UK’s regulatory agency for
communication, issued three notes to broadcasters on Coronavirus reporting in March,
April, and May, warning of the dangers of misleading information. Much of this
focused on the perils of distorted information with respect to medical advice. There was
no follow up on this particular issue in April, but by May 2020 Ofcom warned that care
should be taken with
statements about public health advice on Coronavirus which may not apply to all four
nations in the UK, given the variations in official guidance between the nations. Care
should be taken to ensure that viewers and listeners are made aware in an appropriate
manner of the different approaches taken by public authorities in England, Wales, Scotland
and/or Northern Ireland in areas such as social distancing requirements.49
This suggests a slow awakening in some quarters, not about the asymmetric nature of
devolution but the very existence of devolution and the capacity for variation within the
state. This is one of a number of ways in which the coronavirus crisis has attracted
attention to the extent of and consequences of devolved legislative competence, a pro-
cess that, arguably, should have occurred shortly after 1999.
Conclusion
Evaluating the effects of an event on a political system while that event is ongoing is at
once tempting and perilous. On the one hand, it is difficult to believe that an event as
seismic as the COVID-19 pandemic would not have some sort of political consequence
on a political system, in this case, awareness of, or preferences for, the multinational
settlement in the United Kingdom, or make clear long simmering tensions. On the
other hand, whatever political tendencies we may observe at such an exceptional time
may be subject to change once society returns to some degree of normalcy. If we are to
take Capoccia and Kelemen seriously, however, even the realistic possibility of a major
political shift, whether or not that shift materializes, nevertheless may constitute a crit-
ical juncture.50
In this article, we opt for a relatively safe strategy. We document what had been hap-
pening over the course of the first stage of COVID-19 pandemic response, including
how the UK multinational and asymmetric settlement has influenced the government
response (part I), and what the response tells us about the character of that settlement
(part II). In some ways, the pandemic has further revealed a level of indifference among
the Anglo-British elites about the multi-level character of the state. Below we speculate,
cautiously, about the potential future consequences of these patterns on the multi-
national system of the United Kingdom.
The interaction of the COVID-19 crisis with the peculiar (by international compari-
son) asymmetric territorial arrangement of the UK state has made it possible for
devolved governments to differentiate—at times dissociate—themselves from the central
government’s response. The fact that health care is a devolved responsibility has pro-
vided a platform for devolved political actors to distinguish themselves on policy
choices, on timing, and on communications. While much of the variation on policy and
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 305
timing has been, as we have shown, very much at the margins, at times limited by the
particular distribution of legislative competence, the daily appearance of sub-state
devolved politicians has served to sustain perceptions of competence in devolved admin-
istrations. This is not a blunt rallying around the flag effect, for the same levels of trust
and competence have not been extended to the UK government or Prime Minister.
Obviously, devolved administrations are presiding over infection rates and death tolls
that, in an international context highlight just how badly hit the entire UK has been by
coronavirus. The devolved administrations have benefited, though, from a comparison
with English rates and a UK government that has presided over figures that have been,
at times, the worst in Europe. There are obviously many reasons why individuals choose
to support independence but it is worth noting that support for independence in Wales
rose dramatically after March 2020 and accelerated over the same period in Scotland,
routinely crossing a significant psychological barrier of 50%.
At the same time, the pandemic has revealed more clearly the manner in which the
London-based media and political elites view the UK state and its institutions. We show
that, at least during the first two months of the pandemic, the UK government fre-
quently failed to specify the territorial reach of policy measures it was announcing. The
UK Government’s press briefings also seldom mentioned the devolved jurisdictions. It
was frequently unclear whether a specific announcement applied to the entirety of the
UK or some part of it, though a closer look reveals frequent conflation of measures
applied to England and the UK both by design and by default. This has led to some
confusion among the public with respect to which set of rules one ought to follow. It is
beyond the scope of this particular paper to explore in depth the potential consequences
of that confusion. More importantly from the perspective of our analysis, it reinforces
the point that the UK governing elites tend to view England and the UK interchange-
ably, and (or perhaps because) they do not appear to take seriously the multi-level char-
acter of the UK multinational state. In this sense, the pandemic has proved not so
much a catalyst as a mirror for the multi-level character of the UK multinational state.
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